Continuation War
The Continuation War was fought between Finland and the Soviet Union during World War II; from the Soviet bombing attacks on June 25, 1941, to cease-fire September 4, 1944 (on the Finnish side) and September 5 (on the Soviet side). The United Kingdom declared war on Finland on December 6, 1941, but didn't participate actively. Material support from, and military cooperation with, Nazi Germany was critical for Finland's struggle with the big neighbor. The war was formally concluded by the Paris peace treaty of 1947.
Relative strengths of Finnish, German and Soviet troops at the start of the Continuation War in June 1941
The Continuation War (jatkosota in Finnish) is so named because the Finns view it as a continuation of the Winter War (November 30, 1939, to March 12, 1940). Seen from a Russian perspective, it was merely one of the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. The war was, however, considered separate from the World War by Finland and the Soviet Union – an understanding not quite appreciated by Finland's chief supporters, the Nazi leadership of Germany.
Introduction
Although the Continuation War was fought in the periphery of World War II, and the engaged troops were relatively few, the history of this war is intriguing as it challenges many a conventional wisdom on the World War. Not the least, it refutes the popular theory that democratic countries don't wage war against each other.
During the conflict, Finland acted in concert with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, that in turn was allied to Britain and, for most of the period, the United States. Democratic Finland's association with Nazi Germany was, and remains, controversial in the European democracies threatened and occupied by the Nazis.
The issue was less controversial in Finland, and in hindsight a relatively broad Finnish consensus asserts, that the Finns as a people would most likely not have outlived the war without this cooperation with Nazi Germany. While conventional wisdom among Finns who grew up in the 1960s–70s depictured the Continuation War as a Finnish mistake, the Collapse of the Soviet Union led to access to Soviet sources revealing a firm determination in the Kremlin to put all of Finland under Soviet rule. The same people who in the 1970s were convinced of Finland's guilt for the Great Patriotic War do nowadays assert that there was really nothing Finland could have done to avoid the Winter War and the Continuation War — at least not in the last years before the wars.
Major events of World War II, and the tides of war in general, had significant impact on the course of the Continuation War:
- Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact enabled Soviet pressure against Finland before and after Winter War and pushed Finland to search help from Germany.
- Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa) is closely connected to the Continuation War's beginning.
- The Allied invasion of France (Battle of Normandy) was coordinated with the Soviet major offensive against Finland (June 9-July 15, 1944), leading to a five week long alliance between democratic Finland and Nazi Germany (June 26 to August 4 1944).
- The following US/Soviet race to Berlin brought about the end of the Continuation War by rendering Northern Europe irrelevant.
Aims of war
Finland's main goal during World War II was, although nowhere literally stated, to outlive the war as an independent country, capable to mind its own businesses in a politically hostile environment. Specifically for the Continuation War, Finland aimed at reversing her territorial losses under the March 1940 Moscow Peace Treaty and by extending the territory further east, to guarantee the survival of the Finnic brethren in East-Karelia. Finland's exertion during the World War was, in the former respect, successful, although the price was high in war casualties, reparation payments, territorial loss, bruised international reputation and subsequent adaptation to Soviet international perspectives.The Soviet Union's war goals are harder to assess due to the secretive nature of the Stalinist Soviet Union. Intelligence, as interrogations of POWs, clearly indicated military control of all of Finland's territory as the immediate military goal in both the Winter War and the Continuation War. This is congruent with a (postulated) Russian long-term strategic goal of securing ice-free harbors at the Atlantic and the North Sea. The Soviet Union of the 1930s was however a militarily weak power, and it can be argued that all of her policies up to the Continuation War best are explained as defensive measures (however by offensive means): The sharing of Poland with Nazi Germany, the annexation of the Baltic states and the attempted invasion of Finland in the Winter War can all be seen as elements in the construction of a security zone between the perceived threat from the Capitalist powers of Western Europe and the Communist Soviet Union – similar to the post-war establishment of Soviet satellite states in the Warsaw Pact countries and the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance concluded with post-war Finland. Accordingly, after Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa, June 22, 1941), the Red Army's attack on Finland, harboring not yet unleashed German forces, can be seen as a preemptive or preventive attack aiming to protect Russian civilians and troops: Through control of Finland's territory, the threat against Leningrad (i.e. the old imperial capital Saint Petersburg) and the important harbor in Murmansk was to be fended off. The fate of a couple of millions of Finns was, surely, a lesser concern when Leningrad was at stake.
Although East Karelia has never been part of Finland, majority of its inhabitants were Finnic people, and cultural ties, trade and cross-border marriages were common before World War I and Finnish independence. Indicative of this is that majority of poems in the Kalevala were collected from the backwaters of Eastern Karelia where Swedish and Slavic influences have been lowest. So it was no surprise that after the independence was declared, voices arose advocating the annexation of Eastern Karelia in order to rescue its inhabitants from Soviet oppression.
Immediately after the Civil War in Finland a group of enthusiasts formed a military expedition, the Aunus expedition, to drive the Soviet Russian army from Eastern Karelia, but they were defeated and the expedition had to return Finland. thus in the Treaty of Tartu the Petsamo region was incorporated into Finland instead of Eastern Karelia. The idea lived still in the Akateeminen Karjala-Seura (Academic Karelia Society, AKS), the most influental university student organization before World War II, where numerous contemporary and future political and economic figures participated as members or alumni. Official Finland raised the question of Eastern Karelia several times in the League of Nations, demanding a similar referendum for the future of region as has been arranged in Saarland, Silesia and Schleswig.
In non-leftist circles Imperial Germany's role in the "White" government's victory over rebellious Socialists during the Civil War in Finland was commemorated. The majority of Finns, however, preferred Britain or the Scandinavian countries over Germany. The right extremist Lapua Movement was created to finally make an end to the communists, and it saw the contemporary brand of European democracy as too soft on Communism, which made an alliance with the "New Germany" all the more appealing, since there were no longer Communists in Germany. The Lapua Movement lost its support base due its illegal methods employed against moderate politicians and it was banned in 1932 after a failed rebellion in Mäntsälä. The right wing extremism continued to live in Isänmaallinen Kansanliike (Patriotic Peoples Movement, IKL) which had 14 seats out of the 200 representatives in the Finnish parliament.
The security policy of independent Finland turned first towards a cordon sanitaire, where the newly independent nations Poland, the Baltic Republics and Finland formed a defensive alliance against Russia, but after its collapse, Finland turned to the League of Nations for security. Contacts with the Scandinavian countries were also nurtured, but questions about the control of Ahvenanmaa (ÃÂ
land) and minority languages in Finland and northern Scandinavia prevented success. In 1932 Finland and Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact, but even contemporary analysts considered it worthless.
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact clarified Soviet-German relations and enabled Soviet pressure against the small Baltic republics and Finland, allegedly in order for the Soviet Union to better her own strategic position in Eastern Europe in preparation for a possible widening of the war. The Baltic republics soon gave in to Soviet demands of bases and troop transfer rights, but Finland continued to refuse. As diplomatic pressure had failed, it came time to use arms, and on November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union begun an invasion of Finland—the Winter War.
The Winter War produced a rude awakening in Finns to international politics. The condemnations of League of Nations and countries all over the world seemed to have no effect on Soviet policy. Sweden allowed volunteers to join Finnish army, but did not send regular troops or its air force and in the end did not allow Franco-British troop transfer through its region. France and Britain promised to send combat troops, but when their plans were examined, only a small fraction of those were destined for Finland. To the right wing extremists it was a shock to notice that Nazi Germany did not help at all, but even blocked all material help from other countries as well.
The Moscow Peace Treaty which ended the Winter War was perceived as a great injustice. It seemed as if the losses at the negotiation table, including Finland's second largest city, Viipuri (Vyborg), had been worse than on the battlefield.[1] A fifth of the country's industrial capacity had been lost. Of the twelve percent of Finland's population who lived there, only a few hundred remained, the remaining 420,000 moving to the Finnish side of the border. Also, eleven percent of Finnish agricultural soil was lost, the loss made more severe because it was the best Finland had.
Although the peace treaty was signed, the state of war was not revoked because of the widening world war, the difficult food supply situation and the poor shape of the Finnish military. Censorship was not abolished but was used to suppress critic of the Moscow peace treaty and the most blatantly anti-Soviet comments.
After Nazi Germany's assault on Scandinavia in April (Operation Weserübung), Finland was physically isolated from her traditionally trade markets in the West. Sea routes to and from Finland were now controlled by the Kriegsmarine. The outlet of the Baltic sea was blockaded, and in the far north Finland's route to the world was an arctic dirt road from Rovaniemi to the ice-free harbour of Petsamo, from where the ships had to pass a long stretch of German-occupied Norwegian coast by the Arctic Ocean. Finland, like Sweden, was spared occupation but encircled by Nazi Germany and her Soviet ally.
Especially damaging was the loss of fertilizer imports, that together with the loss of arable land ceded in the Moscow Peace, the loss of cattle during the hasty evacuation after the Winter War, and the unfavourable weather in the summer of 1940 resulted in a drastic fall of foodstuff production to less than two thirds of what was Finland's estimated need. Some of the deficit could be purchased from Sweden, some from the Soviet Union, although delayed deliverances were then a means to exert pressure on Finland. In this situation, Finland had no alternative than to turn to Germany for help.
Finland put her hope in the fragility of the Nazi–Soviet bond, and in the many personal friendships between Finnish and German athlets, scientists, industrialists and military officers. Part of that policy was accrediting the energetic Toivo Mikael Kivimäki for ambassador in Berlin. From May 1940 Finland pursued a campaign to re-establish the good relations with Germany that had soured in the last year of the 1930s. Finnish mass media not only refrained from criticism of Nazi Germany, but also took active part in this campaign. Dissent was censored. Seen from Berlin, the contrast was stark to the annoyingly anti-Nazi press in Sweden.
From the campaign to ease the Third Reich's coldness towards Finland, it seemed a natural development to also promote closer relations and cooperation. Not the least since the much disliked Moscow Peace Treaty in clear language tried to persuade the Finns not to do exactly that. Propaganda in the censured press contributed to Finland's international re-orientation — although with very measured means.
The continued state of war made it possible for President Kyösti Kallio to ask Field Marshal Mannerheim to remain commander-in-chief and supervise the reorganization of Finland's Armed Forces and the fortification of the new border; a task that was critically important in the unruly times. Within a week after the peace treaty was signed, the fortification works were started along the 1200 km long Salpalinja ("Latch Line"), where the focus was between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Saimaa. During the summer and autumn Finland received material purchased and donated during and immediately after the Winter War, but it took several months before Mannerheim was able to present a somewhat positive assessment of the state of the army. Military expenditures rose in 1940 to 45% of Finland's state budget. Military purchases were prioritised over civilian needs. Mannerheim's position and the continued state of war enabled an efficient management of the military, but it created an unfortunate parallel government that time to time clashed with the structures of civilian government.
To protest Moscow Peace Treaty two ministers resigned and Prime Minister Ryti was forced to form new cabinet right away. To achieve better national consensus all other parties except right extremist IKL participated to the cabinet.
The most difficult post to fill was foreign minister, where Ryti and Mannerheim first asked Finland's ambassador in London, but after he declined Rolf Witting, who was less British-oriented and more in the taste of the Germans (although they first considered also him anglophile), was selected.
During the last days of war there has been discussions between Finnish and Swedish governments about Nordic Defence Alliance, possibly including also Norway and Denmark. March 15 this plan was published for discuss in parliaments. Soviet Union declaration March 29 that the alliance would be in breach of the Moscow Peace Treaty ended the talks and German invasion of Denmark and Norway killed even the option of smaller three-way alliance thus isolating Sweden.
Implementation of Moscow Peace Treaty created problems due to Soviet Vae Victis-mentality. Border arrangements in Enso industrial area which even Soviet members of border commission considered to be on the Finnish side of the border, forced return of evacuated machinery, locomotives and rail cars and inflexibility in questions which could ease hardships created by new border, like fishing rights and the usage of Saimaa Canal only increased distrust to objectives of the Soviet Union.
In June 23 Soviet Union proposed that Finland should revoke Petsamo mining rights from the British-Canadian company and give them to Soviets and grant Soviets also rights to handle security in the area. June 27 Soviets demanded either demilitarization or joined fortification effort in Ahvenanmaa(ÃÂ
land). When Sweden had signed troop transfer treaty with Germany July 8, Soviet Foreign minister Molotov demanded similar rights to Soviet troops to Hanko at July 9. The demilitarization was agreed October 11 and transfer rights were given September 6, but negotiations on Petsamo just dragged on, Finnish negotiators stalling as much as possible.
Communist Party was so discredited in Winter War, that it never managed to surface between the wars. Instead, May 22 "Peace and Friendship Society of Finland and Soviet Union" (SNS) was created and it actively propagated Soviet viewpoints. It started by critizising government and military and gained around 35 000 members at maximum. Boldened by it's success it started organizing almost daily violent demonstrations during the first half of August. The government reacted forcefully and arrested leading members of the society which ended the demonstrations. The SNS was finally outlawed in December 1940.
Also in August 15 Soviet Union demanded that Väinö Tanner should be discharged from the cabinet because of his anti-Soviet stance.
All of this reminded public heavily the script how Baltic Republics were occupied and annexed during the same summer, only few months earlier. So it was no wonder that average Finn felt that Winter War had produced only a short delay from the same fate.
After the Moscow Peace Treaty ending the Winter War, public opinion in Finland longed for the re-acquisition of the homes of the 12% of Finland's population who had been forced to leave Karelia in haste.
The experience from World War I emphasized the importance of close and friendly relations with the victors, which is why Nazi Germany was intensely courted immediately after the Winter War despite the fact that Hitler's Third Reich had been the ally of the invader.
From August 18, 1940, Finland secretly negotiated with the German Wehrmacht on military cooperation, buying artillery and other badly needed weapons — for the Third Reich this was in breach of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Finland in return facilitated German troop transfers to Finnmark in Northern Norway (occupied by the Wehrmacht since June-July 1940).
Through the potential presence of German troops on Finnish territory, Finland hoped to deter further Soviet threats, which in turn would threaten to involve the Third Reich on Finland's side. This was also seen to counterbalance the USSR's troop transfer right through Finland to the Soviet naval base at the Hanko peninsula in western Finland, which had been handed over as a result of the Winter War.
This secret Finno-German agreement undermined not only the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but constituted a material breach of the Moscow Peace Treaty (ending the Winter War), which in fact was chiefly targeted against cooperation between Germany and Finland. It has in retrospect been disputed whether the ailing President Kallio was informed. Possibly the then-premier Risto Ryti, in concert with Field Marshal Mannerheim [1], took it as their responsibility during Kallio's illness.
Adolf Hitler had not been interested in Finland before the Winter War. Now he saw the value of Finland as a base for his forthcoming invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa), and perhaps also the military value of the Finnish army. The Finno-German agreement negotiated in August 1940 was formalized in September. It allowed the Wehrmacht the right to send its troops by trucks and busses through Finland, ostensibly to facilitate Nazi Germany's reinforcement of its forces in northern Norway.
A further German-Finnish agreement in December 1940 led to the stationing of German troops in Finland (mainly in the vicinity of the northern border to the Soviet Union). In the coming months they arrived in small but increasing numbers, establishing quarters, depots and bases along the road to Norway, which later would be used for the concentration of troops aimed for Northern Russia.
Although the Finnish people knew only the barest details of the agreements with the Third Reich, the pro-German policy was generally approved, especially among the displaced Karelians who wanted to recover the ceded territory of Karelia.
The Finnish military was aware of the German plans for invasion of Russia, although Hitler's real intentions remained unclear. An uncertainty still prevailed as to whether Hitler really intended to attack the Soviet Union before the Battle of Britain was concluded. Through military contacts, Germans hinted to the Finns that they could possibly persuade the Germans to obtain Soviet concessions; and the Finnish general Aksel Airo delivered in late May 1941 five alternate border rearrangement drafts to the Germans, who should then propose the best they felt they could bargain for to the Soviets. In reality, the Germans had no such intentions, but the exercise served to fuel the support among leading Finns for taking part in Operation Barbarossa.
However, the Finns had in the past bitterly learnt how a small country can be used as small change in the deals of great powers, and in such a case Finland could have been used as a token of reconciliation between Hitler and Stalin, something which the Finns had every reason to fear, which is why the relations with Berlin were considered of the utmost priority for the future of Finland.
Race issues were reasons of particular concern: the Finns were not viewed favorably by the Nazi race theorists. By active participation on Germany's side, Finnish leaders hoped for a more independent position in post-war Europe, through the removal of the Soviet threat and the incorporation of the akin Finnic peoples of neighbouring Soviet areas. This view gained increasing popularity in the Finnish leadership, and also in the press, during the preparations for the awaited outbreak of hostilities between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union.
Voices advocating closer ties with Germany grew stronger and the voices advocating armed neutrality within Finland's new borders (some among the Social Democrats, and some of the more left-leaning in the Swedish People's Party) softened. Contacts with Sweden's Conservative Foreign Minister Günther showed an enthusiasm unusual for the Swedes for the anticipated "Crusade against Bolshevism".
Finland's army under Marshal Mannerheim felt it had a broad political support for increasing cooperation with Nazi Germany, and accepted the condition to not only put virtually half of the Soviet-Finnish border under German control, but also to put Finnish army units under German command. Some officers (for instance many of them with background in the Finnish Jaeger troops) were happy with this, others less so. Civilian politicians were not deemed fit for such extremely sensitive information.
What began for the Finns as a defensive strategy, designed to provide a German counterweight to Soviet pressure, ended as an offensive strategy, aimed at re-conquest of the formerly Finnish Karelia and an invasion of East Karelia in the Soviet Union. The Finns had been lured by the prospects of regaining their lost territories and ridding themselves of the Soviet threat into becoming a party to Nazi Germany's planned invasion of the USSR.
Finland took no part in the initial German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, since the Finnish government did not wish to appear as the aggressor; the popular support for such a move was deemed insufficient, and international relations would have suffered in vain. Hitler's public statement gave a different impression, however; Hitler declared that Germany would attack the Bolshevists "(...) in the North in alliance ["im Bunde"] with the Finnish freedom heroes". Finland actually had declared herself neutral, but had already before Germany's assault contributed with mines in the Gulf of Finland, in accordance with German wishes.
Three days later, reports of Soviet bombing of the towns of Helsinki, Turku and Porvoo gave the Finnish government the needed pretext to open hostilities, and war was declared on June 26. After Finland's declaration of war, the German troops in Northern Finland started their offensive against the Soviet Union on June 28, a week after the actual start of Operation Barbarossa.
The furthest advance of Finnish units in the Continuation War. Borders for both before and after the Winter War are shown
On July 10, the Finnish army began a major offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga. Mannerheim's order of the day clearly states that the Finnish involvement was an offensive one.[1] By the end of August 1941, Finnish troops had reached the pre-war boundaries. The crossing of the pre-war borders led to tensions in the army, the cabinet, the parties of the parliament, and domestic opinion. Military expansionism might have gained popularity, but it was far from unanimously championed.
Also, international relations were strained — notably with Britain and Sweden, whose governments in May and June had learned in confidence from Foreign Minister Witting that Finland had absolutely no plans for a military campaign coordinated with the Germans. Finland's preparations were said to be purely defensive.
Sweden's leading cabinet members had hoped to improve the relations with Nazi Germany through indirect support of Operation Barbarossa, mainly channeled through Finland. Prime Minister Hansson and Foreign Minister Günther found however, that the political support in the National Unity Government and within the Social Democratic organizations turned out to be insufficient, particularly after Mannerheim's July 10 Order of the Day, and even more so after Finland within less than two months undeniably had begun a war of conquest. A tangible effect was that Finland became still more dependent on food and munitions from Germany.
In December 1941, the Finnish advance had reached the outskirts of Leningrad and the River Svir (which connects the southern ends of Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega and marks the southern border of East Karelia). By the end of 1941, the front stabilized, and the Finns did not conduct major offensive operations for the following two and a half years. The fighting morale of the troops declined when it was realized that the war would not soon end.
It has been suggested that the execution of the prominent pacifist leader Arndt Pekurinen in November 1941 was due to fear of army demoralization being exacerbated by such activism.
Finland's participation in the war brought major benefits to Nazi Germany. The Soviet fleet was blockaded in the Gulf of Finland, so that the Baltic was freed for the training of German submarine crews as well as for German shipping, especially for the transport of the vital iron ore from northern Sweden, and nickel and rare metals needed in steel processing from the Petsamo area. The Finnish front secured the northern flank of the German Army Group North in the Baltic states. The sixteen Finnish divisions tied down numerous Soviet troops, put pressure on Leningrad — although Mannerheim refused to attack — and threatened the Murmansk Railroad. Additionally, Sweden was further isolated and was increasingly pressured to comply with German and Finnish wishes, though with limited success.
Despite Finland's contributions to the German cause, the Western Allies had ambivalent feelings, torn between residual goodwill for Finland and the need to accommodate their vital ally, the Soviet Union. As a result, Britain declared war against Finland, but the United States did not. There was no combat between these countries and Finland, but Finnish sailors were interned overseas. In the United States, Finland was highly regarded, partly due to having continued to make payments on its World War I debt faithfully throughout the inter-war period.
The Allies often characterize Finland as one of the Axis Powers, although the term used in Finland is "co-belligerence with Germany". Finland later also earned respect in the West for the strength of its democracy and its refusal to allow extension of Nazi anti-Semitic practices in Finland. Finnish Jews served in the Finnish army, and Jews were not only tolerated in Finland[1], but most Jewish refugees also were granted asylum (less than 20 of the more than 500 refugees were handed over to the Nazis). The field synagogue in Eastern Karelia was probably unique on the German side during the war. However, in the few cases Jewish officers from Finland's defence forces were awarded the German Iron Cross, they declined.
About 2,600-2,800 Soviet prisoners of war were handed over to the Germans. Most of them (around 2,000) joined the Russian Liberation Army. The rest were mainly army officers and political officers (and a handful of Jewish refugees), most of them dying in Nazi concentration camps, while some were given to the Gestapo for interrogation. Sometimes these handovers were demanded in return of arms or food, and sometimes the Finns received Soviet prisoners of war in return. These were mainly Estonians and Karelians willing to join the Finnish army. These, as well as some volunteers from the occupied Eastern Karelia, formed the Tribe Battalion (Finnish: "Heimopataljoona"). At the end of the war, the USSR required that the members of the Tribe Battalion were to be handed over to the Soviet Union. Some managed to escape before or during the transport, but most of them were either sent to the Gulag camps or executed.
In 1941, even before the Continuation War, one battalion of Finnish volunteers joined the German Waffen-SS with silent approval of the Finnish government. It has been concluded that the battalion served as a token of Finnish commitment to cooperation with Nazi Germany. This battalion, named the Finnisches Freiwilligen Bataillon fought as part of the 5th SS Wiking Division in the Ukraine and Caucasia. The battalion was pulled back from the front in May 1943 and was transported to Tallinn where it was disbanded on July 11. The soldiers were then transferred into different units of the Finnish army.
Instead, on June 9 1944, the Soviet Union opened a major offensive against Finnish positions on the Karelian Isthmus and in the Lake Ladoga area (it was timed to accompany the D-Day). On the second day of the offensive, the Soviet forces broke through the Finnish lines, and in the succeeding days they made advances that appeared to threaten the survival of Finland. Finland especially lacked modern anti-tank weaponry, which could stop heavy Soviet tanks, and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop offered them in exchange for a guarantee that Finland would not again seek a separate peace. On June 26 President Risto Ryti gave this guarantee as a personal undertaking, which he intended to last for the remainder of his presidency. In addition to material deliveries, Hitler sent some assault gun brigades and a Luftwaffe fighter-bomber unit to temporarily support the most threatened defense sectors.
With new supplies from Germany, the Finns were now equal to the crisis, and halted the Russians in early July 1944, after a retreat of about one hundred kilometers that brought them to approximately the same line of defense they had held at the end of Winter War, the Viipuri(Vyborg)-Kuparsaari-Taipale(VKT)-line running from Vyborg to the Vuoksi River and along the river to Lake Ladoga, where the Soviet offensive were stopped in the Battle of Tali-Ihantala. Finland had already become a sideshow for the Soviet leadership, which now turned their attention to Poland and south-eastern Europe. Although the Finnish front was once again stabilized, the Finns were exhausted and wanted to get out of the war.
Mannerheim had repeatedly reminded the Germans that in case their troops in Estonia retreated, Finland would be forced to make a peace even at very unfavorable cost. Soviet-occupied Estonia would have provided the enemy a favorable base for amphibious invasions, air attacks against Helsinki and other cities, and have strangled Finnish access to the sea. When the Germans indeed withdrew, the Finnish urge to end the war increased. Perhaps because of realizing the validity of this point, initial German reaction to Finland's announcement of separate peace was limited to only vocal opposition.
President Ryti resigned, and Finland's military leader and national hero, Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, became president, accepting the responsibility for ending the war.
On September 4 the cease-fire ended military actions on the Finnish side. The Soviet Union ended hostilities exactly 24 hours later than the Finns. An armistice was signed in Moscow September 19 between the Soviet Union and Finland. Finland had to make many limiting concessions: the Soviet Union regained the borders of 1940, with the addition of the Petsamo area. The Porkkala Peninsula (adjacent to Finland's capital Helsinki) was leased to the USSR as a naval base for fifty years (but returned in 1956), and transit rights were granted. Finland's army was to demobilize in haste, and Finland was required to expel all German troops from its territory. As the Germans refused to leave Finland voluntarily, the Finns had no choice but to fight their former supporters in the Lapland War.
In any event, Finland's fate was no worse than any other country struck by the World War — quite the contrary. Finland had defended her territory and her civilians with more success than most other European countries. Only 2,000 Finnish civilians were killed during World War II, and only relatively narrow border regions had been conquered by force. For nearly three years until June 20, 1944, when Vyborg fell, not one major Finnish town was besieged or occupied.
After the war, Finland preserved her independence while adjusting her foreign policy to avoid offence to the USSR, now the world's second superpower, a concession which the Soviet government reciprocated by surrendering part of its gains from the postwar settlement and refraining from too obvious intrusions in Finland's domestic affairs. To Moscow, an independent Finland seemingly was a price worth paying for keeping Sweden formally neutral in the Cold War, a quid pro quo that for forty years safeguarded wider Soviet strategic interests in the region.
Background
Before World War II
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Winter War
After the Moscow Peace Treaty
Coordination with Germany
By the spring of 1941, the German army's standing was at its zenith, and its victory in the war seemed more than likely. Outbreak of the war
The signs and rumors of the German assault on Russia heaped up, and on June 9 partial mobilization was ordered, and the northern Finish air defense troops (consisting of 30,000 men) were put under German command. In practice the Wehrmacht already held the northern half of the border to Russia. On June 14 the 3rd Army Corps was mobilized and put under German command. On June 17 general mobilization took place, and on June 20 Finland's government ordered 45,000 people at the Soviet border to be evacuated. On June 21 Finland's chief of the General Staff, Erik Heinrichs, was finally informed by his German counterpart that the attack was to begin.
Diplomatic maneuvers
Operation Barbarossa was planned as a blitzkrieg lasting a few weeks. British and US observers believed that the invasion would be concluded before August. In the autumn of 1941, this turned out to be wrong, and leading Finnish military officers started to mistrust Germany's capacity. German troops in Northern Finland faced circumstances they were not properly prepared for, and failed badly to reach their targets, most importantly Murmansk. Finland's strategy now changed. A separate peace with the Soviet Union was offered, but Germany's strength was too great. The idea that Finland had to continue the war while putting its own forces at the least possible danger gained increasing support, perhaps in the hopes that the Wehrmacht and the Red Army would wear each other down enough for negotiations to begin, or to at least get them out of the way of Finland's independent decisions. Some may also have still hoped for an eventual victory by Germany.The end of the war
Finland began actively to seek a way out of the war after the disastrous German defeat at Stalingrad in January-February 1943. Edwin Linkomies formed a new cabinet with the peace process as the top priority. Negotiations were conducted intermittently in 1943-44 between Finland and its representative Juho Kusti Paasikivi on the one side, and the Western Allies and the Soviet Union on the other, but no agreement was reached.Conclusion
In retrospect the Continuation War might be seen as the result of a series of political miscalculations by the Finnish leadership in which Finland's martial abilities clearly outshone her diplomatic skills. The matter has been thoroughly scrutinized in Finland, and many commentators also hold that Finland was a victim of bad luck in addition to any failings on its own part, being forced to make a choice in a situation when any of the available alternatives would result in being attacked by either side.
According to the prior proceedings of war at the time, Finland chose the alternative that seemed then to provide better chances of post-war survival. The aged Field Marshal Mannerheim might have been responsible for a couple of misjudgments, for instance the infamous Order of the Day of July 10, 1941, but at the end of the war he had earned a remarkable reputation among former foes and allies, in Finland as well as abroad, which to a considerable degree eased Finland's extrication from a potentially disastrous undertaking.Battles and operations
See also
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